

FIT5124 Advanced Topics in Security

Hacking Techniques III – Web Browser
Exploitation

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Hacking Techniques III

Web Browser Exploitation:

Web browsers are most often used application today – attractive target for hackers.

Today: A look at some known browser exploitation techniques.

Plan for this lecture: Exploitation techniques, examples, and defenses for:

- Heap Overflow Exploit techniques:
 - 'Heap Spray' technique
 - 'Heap Engineering' technique
 - 'Use After Free' technique
 - Example defenses

Heap Overflow Exploits

Recall: **Heap** is a segment in machine memory space

- Used to store dynamically allocated variables
- Managed by an OS **heap allocation manager** (called by the Browser via malloc system calls).
- Heap space allocated by OS to browser managed by a **browser heap manager** (e.g. storage of current web page HTML objects).

Observations about heap:


- Browser's Javascript engine creates objects on heap for Javascript program objects, e.g.
 - Javascript string objects,
 - Javascript 'ActiveX' objects

Heap Overflow Exploits

Observations about heap (cont.):

- Objects (e.g. 'ActiveX' objects) often include **virtual functions**.
 - Virtual functions – implementation can be overwritten by a subclass inheriting from parent class
 - Hence, address of virtual function implementation not known at compile time
 - Implemented as a **vtable**: virtual function = ptr to address of implementation (ptr set at compile time).

Example:



Heap Overflow Exploits

Suppose: browser heap manager contains vulnerability

- e.g. buffer overflow into ActiveX object's virtual function vtable

Possible Exploit:

- Attacker's Javascript can write strings containing malicious code into heap.
- Attacker uses overflow vulnerability to overwrite vtable pointer to point to malicious code.

Attacker goal: place a string object Sobj before Vtable for Obj




Figure : Before Overflow

Heap Overflow Exploits

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Attacker goal: overflow Sobj into Vtable to point to malicious code





Figure : After Overflow

Heap Overflow Exploits

But... malicious code strings could be allocated anywhere in heap (attacker doesn't know where!).

Q: Where should attacker point his overflow vtable pointer?

Attacker goal: overflow Sobj into Vtable to point to malicious code



Attacker unlikely to guess correctly location of string S....

Possible A: 'Heap Spray' technique!

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Spray Technique


Idea:

- Fill large fraction of heap with NOP sleds leading to malicious code.
- Set overflowed vtable ptr **anywhere** in heap

Goal: High probability that vtable ptr points somewhere in (one of) NOP sleds!

- Hence: much higher probability of attack success!

Attacker goal: fill heap with (NOP sled, mal. code) blocks



Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Spray Technique

Possible Heap Spray Implementation in Javascript [HFS07]:

```
var nop = unescape("%u9090%u9090");

// Create a 1MB string of NOP instructions followed by shellcode:
//
// malloc header   string length   NOP slide   shellcode   NULL terminator
// 32 bytes       4 bytes         x bytes     y bytes     2 bytes

while (nop.length <= 0x100000/2) nop += nop;

nop = nop.substring(0, 0x100000/2 - 32/2 - 4/2 - shellcode.length - 2/2);

var x = new Array();

// Fill 200MB of memory with copies of the NOP slide and shellcode
for (var i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
    x[i] = nop + shellcode;
}
```

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Engineering

Q: How does attacker place overflowed buffer object next to target object Obj?:

Possible A: Heap Engineering [HPS07,DHM08]

- Defragment the heap ('plug' the 'holes') with overflowing (vulnerable) objects.
- Create regular holes between overflowing objects.
- Insert target object into regular holes.

Hence, target object will likely be next to an overflowing object!



Figure 3: Defragmented heap with many allocations. We see a long line of same-sized buffers that we control.




Figure 4: Controlled heap with every other buffer freed. The allocation of the vulnerable buffer ends up in one of the holes.

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Engineering

Heap Eng. Implementation in Javascript [DHM08]:

Step 1: Defragmenting the heap

```
var bigdummy = new Array(1000);
for(i=0; i<1000; i++){

    bigdummy[i] = new Array(size);
}
```

Step 2: Create regular holes between overflowing objects.

```
for(i=900; i<1000; i+=2){
    delete(bigdummy[i]);
}

for(i=0; i<4100; i++){
    a = .5;
}
```

Step 3: Insert target object into regular holes.

```
for(i=901; i<1000; i+=2){
    bigdummy[i][0] = new Number(i);
}
```

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Engineering

Heap Eng. Implementation in Javascript [DHM08] (cont):

After step 3, have the following situation:




Figure 5: Details of an attacker controlled block just before the overflow is triggered.

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Engineering

Heap Eng. Implementation in Javascript [DHM08] (cont):

Then heap is sprayed and overflow is triggered, and we get:




Figure 6: Details of an attacker controlled block just after the overflow is triggered.

Practical Difficulty: overflow into vtable ptr, not vtable itself!

- Double indirection - execution jumps to $*(* psled)!!$

Q: How to spray?

Heap Overflow Exploits: Heap Engineering

Heap Eng. Implementation in Javascript [DHM08] (cont):

Possible A: Spray heap with 'NOP sled' dword value 0x52780278

How does it work?

- First indirection: (* psled) points to 'magic NOP sled' with high probability (spray trick).
 - Points to address 0x52780278 - hope that this falls in spray area too (self-referential).
- Second indirection: *(* psled) points back into to 'magic NOP sled' with high probability.
 - Opcode meaning of dword 0x52780278:

```
78 02:  js +0x2
78 52:  js +0x52
```
 - Whether first condition is true or false, will always jump to next dword (+2 words)!


Heap Overflow Exploits: Use After Free (UAF) Vulnerabilities

In 2012-2014, several heap vulnerabilities were discovered and **exploited in the field** in Microsoft IE [Yas13,Yas14].

They fall into the class of 'Use After Free' (UAF) vulnerabilities

UAF Vulnerability: Browser code frees heap allocation for object, but later **dereference** the freed object!

- Exploit: Attacker trigger the free, then reallocates the freed memory to object containing attacker malicious code!



Heap Overflow Exploits: Defenses

Several proposed (partially effective) countermeasures:

- Browser heap isolation (e.g. Microsoft's 2014 'Isolated Heap').
 - Use a separate heap for string objects as for other (e.g. ActiveX) objects (heap eng. technique with strings not possible, some UAF exploits prevented).
- Randomized heap allocation (against heap eng.)
- Heap overflow protection using non-writable pages between writable ones (e.g. FreeBSD)
- Nozzle (Microsoft) [RLZ09]: Detect a lot of code in the heap (detect spraying).

Counter-countermeasures by hackers are being devised, e.g. UAF exploit against IE's 'Isolated Heap' [D15]

References referred to in the Slides

- DHM08 M. Daniel, J. Honorroff, C. Miller, Engineering Heap Overflow Exploits with Javascript, In Proceedings of Usenix WOOT 2008.
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- RLZ09 P. Ratanaworabhan and B. Livshits and B. Zorn, Nozzle: A defense against Heap-Spraying Code Injection Attacks, In Proceedings of Usenix Security 2009.
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- Yas14 M. Yason, Understanding IEs New Exploit Mitigations: The Memory Protector and the Isolated Heap, Security Intelligence, August 2014. <http://securityintelligence.com/understanding-ies-new-exploit-mitigations-the-memory-protector-and-the-isolated-heap>
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